#### -SECRET

- 1. Attached is Annex A Statements of Soviet Officials

  About NOSENKO which is part of the summary entitled,

  Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich

  NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The

  aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on

  13 March 1978.
- 2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
- 3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

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- 1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.
- 2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
- 3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

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# Top Secret

### CONTENTS

1	<i>-</i> 1	١ 7	L.

VIII	SEVENTH	DEPARTMENT	(January	1962-January	1964)
	•		•	(	Cont.)

bepaty office of beveren bepatement	
(July 1962-January 1964)	291
KGB Operations	292
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY	292
Investigation of SLESINGER	293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN	295
GRU Agent SHUBIN	2.96
Arrest of BARGHOORN	298
Investigation of OSWALD	303
Residence in USSR	303
Request to Return to USSR	305
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File	307
The CHEREPANOV Papers	309
Contents	314
NOSENKO's Travel Document	315
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)	316
Purpose of Trip	317
Visits to KGB Legal Residency	318
Availability for Meetings with GIA	318
NOSENKO's Written Notes	319
NOSENKO's Defection	320
The Recall Telegram	324
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department	
Operations	325
Operational Activities (July 1962-	
January 1964)	326
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among	
American Tourists	326
Information Furnished the KGB by	
George BLAKE	327
KGB Study of American Intelligence	
Tourist Operations	327
NOSENKO's Information	330
Summary	331
Summary and Conclusion	331

(vi)

TS No. 197124





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# Top Secret

### CONTENTS

	PAGE
IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE	335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV Communist Party Status Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures Awards and Decorations Sourcing Ranks	335 338 342 345 349 350
X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT	. 355
XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES	357
Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO	361
Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text	399
Index of Personalities	437

(vii)

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

#### Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

20

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himade self. Quoted to a KGB office the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval

46

college in 1942.

TS No. 197124 Copy \_\_\_\_\_

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment:

(Continued)

After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

### Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

47

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Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.

The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive source

is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to NOSENKO attended this the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU sou Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.,

49

**Top Secret** 

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source two has quoted/KGB officers respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

### NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

50

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. TS No. 197124

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

> FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment:

FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962. which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter.

a sensitive source

According to FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the Soyiet intelligence service.

### Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment:

PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

266

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counterintelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment:

SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General. Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,

a sensitive source identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

277

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to a sensitive source.

### Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Forin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

278

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

#### Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big. big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment:

In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A. because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

#### M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

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### Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

#### NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

#### Comment:

A sensitive source

had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

294

**Top Secret** 

TS No. 197124



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### **Top Secret**

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

Comment

(Continued)

In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

### (KOTEN's) Arrest and the KGB Agent


NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from a sensitive source.

#### NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that (KOTEN) might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

295

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### **Top Secret**

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment:

a sensitive source

Earlier, identified a agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

297

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

sensitive sources,

Comment:

Other sources, including have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

313

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)


#### The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, MOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

#### Comment:

Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.



324

**Top Secret** 

No. 197124

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### Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)



### NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

### Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

325

**Top Secret** 

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary


To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of (SVENCHANSKIY) the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held.

# KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

326

**Top Secret** 



(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSEHKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

a sensitive source As indicated in Annex A, reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIDANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 3%) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador . DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

336

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

# SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of 😘 KGB Carrier Market Committee of the Committe

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

357

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

Copy 10

#### TOP SECRET

- 1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

  Defector Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).

  Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.
- 2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
- 3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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#### Annex A

### Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

#### 4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

#### 6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

#### 8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

### 9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

### 10 February 1964


The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

### **Fop Secret**

(Annex A)

#### 10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.





According to a sensitive source,

Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source,

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

362

TS No. 197124

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)
According to a sensitive source

NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shippard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source,

several KGS

It appeared quite certain to to officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source,

from KCB officers

The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.One worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment:

The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of a sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment:

Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

#### 11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

#### 12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

364

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(Annex A)

#### 12 February 1964 (continued)


At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

#### 12-13 February 1964



#### 14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

365

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(Annex A)


#### 14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the domand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

#### 18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".





366

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(Annex A)





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368

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According to a sensitive source.

NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books.

Dexpressed the A KGB officer opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.

Said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred to above.

369


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According to a sensitive source, in response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

#### 22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

stationed at the American Embassy in Moncow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

#### 24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

371

Top Secret



(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in

England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

According to a sensitive source,

KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.




372

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(Annex A)



#### February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.


KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.





### Ton Source

February-March 1964



A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."





374

4 March 1964

According to a sensitive source,

officers:


NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms

until the January-March 1965 interrogations,

when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally

in the "chiefs' dining room".



375

Top Secret

TS No. 197124 Copy 10

(Annex A)

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#### 23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

376

Top Secret

TS No. 197124 Copy \_\_\_\_\_

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source

(from various unnamed KGB officers certain There seems to be unanimous opinion among KGB chiefs that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some KGB "chiefs" that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

#### 31 March 1964

KGB officers [I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENBO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENBO, and NOSENBO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in (Canada)


NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

#### March 1964


According to a sensitive source who briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

a sensitive source

In this and other contexts has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.



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379

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
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(Annex A)

#### <u>April-May 1964</u>

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee
JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather
than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one
of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United
States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme
caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts
with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify
JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had
which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
p. 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

#### AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF





May 1964: According to a sensitive source

(from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB
officers

been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to

determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN,
and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt
to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency
of the KGB.


380

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(Annex A)

20 May 1964 According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.



### 12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

#### 22 June 1964

According to a sensitive source

(from various unnamed KGB officers

The consensus among KGB employees

is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence.

NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

#### 22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

#### 29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. C.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

382

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source

"Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some staty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known to Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

by a sensitive source

Comment:

MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly/stationed in New York City, was said by to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad.

Another sensitive source

383

TS No. 197124 Copy 10

### Jop Secret

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment:

(Continued)

a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

#### 29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK. [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. CUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

384

(Annex A)

#### 29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment:

NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

#### July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source:


nformation about NOSENKO was from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

385

Top Secret

TS No. 197124 Copy 10

(Annex A)



#### November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

386


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(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment:

GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".



December 1964

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK source reported to the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, thought the KGB might go so far

387

source

Top Secret

TS No. 197124 Copy 10

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ( later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.) Source

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965

According to a sensitive source

(from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers : It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information", concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota-"Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment:

NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

388

Top Secret

(Annex A)

 $\frac{8}{\text{According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer}}$ 

defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. (attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

the KGB officer

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment:

GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source

(from conversations with KGB officers

Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

390

(Annex A)

15 July 1965 According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer


who attended the Moscow meeting described): of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there.

source

a sen- described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment:

NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.



391

Top Secret

(Annex A)

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source

): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KOB ifficers were punished, expelled from the Barty, and from the BGE. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

<u>Winter 1965-1966</u> Source, a

chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962.

Source that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

392

Top Secret

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's

Comment: allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

March 1966 According to a sensitive source,

(from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to was an important Source boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

Source


393

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March 1966 (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like , called the GRU Source Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. Source the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.



394

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TS No. 197124 Copy \_\_\_\_\_

# Top Secret

(Annex A)



395

Top Secret

TS No. 197124
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(Annex A)



#### Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGR Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

### October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

396

**Top Secret** 

TS No. 197124 Copy \_\_\_\_\_

 $(\Lambda nnex \Lambda)$ 

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source

(from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, his explanation, he would call a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

397

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967

According to a sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):

NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967
According to a sensitive source

The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KCB.

5 June 1967 According to a sensitive source

\*\* There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

398

Top Secret


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### SECRE

### ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

### ABOUT NOSENKO





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#### ANNEX A

#### STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO.

These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.

None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent by who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raises a question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by SOURCE can be given any particular weight or that it represents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.

Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO,

the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are
sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3
cited elsewhere, is the information from
and
sensitive Source #2
Source #1, Source #3
and probably in that order.

Source #2
had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their

comments were based on information from third parties or obtained
through conversation. There are discrepancies between what

Source #2
and have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has



Source #1 Source #2 said, but under the given circumstances of how and and acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected.

No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1 that have furnished no information that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

It is felt that information from

is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case,
but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO

is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof

he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO

was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of

all available information. It must be realized there is a possibility

Source #1, Source #3

NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and

Source #2

and

be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that

NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona


Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2.

fides of

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,

according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had been received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his CIA contacts and stated he had defected.

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous statements on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained, that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he invented the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as a logical reason for his precipitate defection.



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Source #1 Source #2
between information from and and from NOSENKO
have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified.

Source #1 and Source #2
In some instances the information from and and is
adjudged to be inaccurate. The judgment is based on the hearsay nature
of the reporting by and and measured against the absence
of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO.

Examples are information from Source #1 that NOSENKO had been

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affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also Source #2, certain discrepancies between information furnished by Source #1 and Source #3 in and in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO prior to 1964.

In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information Source #1 from as to certain KGB officers whom understood NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had previously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explanation is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe Source #1 had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize a name and/or photograph.

As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had never commented on the KGB telephone book which source #1 ported NOSENKO, had in his possession.

During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning

how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of an FCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that there was at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each room occupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the

Source #1
information furnished by concerning the telephone directory

and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical

Source #1
since could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone

directory which he had never seen.